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This paper develops a simple theory of capital controls as dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation. We
study an infinite horizon endowment economy with two countries. One country chooses taxes on international
capital flows in order to maximize the welfare of its representative agent, while the other country is
passive. We show that capital controls are not guided by the absolute desire to alter the intertemporal
price of the goods produced in any given period, but rather by the relative strength of this desire between
two consecutive periods. Specifically, it is optimal for the strategic country to tax capital inflows (or
subsidize capital outflows) if it grows faster than the rest of the world and to tax capital outflows (or
subsidize capital inflows) if it grows more slowly. In the long-run, if relative endowments converge
to a steady state, taxes on international capital flows converge to zero. Although our theory emphasizes






















Since the end of World War II, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have led to dra-
matic tariff reductions around the world, contributing to a spectacular increase in world
trade; see Subramanian and Wei (2007) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Starting in the
mid-1980s, the world has also experienced a dramatic increase in capital markets inte-
gration, with increased cross-border ﬂows both across industrial countries and between
industrial and developing countries; see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009). In sum,
the world has experienced a dramatic increase in intratemporal and intertemporal trade,
as Figure 1 illustrates.
The multilateral institutions that promote both types of trade, however, have followed
two verydifferent approaches. Theprimary goal ofthe World Trade Organization (WTO),
and its predecessor the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, has been to reduce
relative price distortions in intratemporal trade. The focus on relative price distortions
and their associated terms-of-trade implications in static environments has a long and
distinguished history in the international trade literature, going back to Torrens (1844)
and Mill (1844). This rich history is echoed by recent theoretical and empirical work
emphasizing the role of terms-of-trade manipulation in the analysis of optimal tariffs and
its implication for the WTO; see Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2011) and Broda, Limao, and
Weinstein (2008).
By contrast, international efforts toward increased capital openness have emphasized
the effects of capital controls on macroeconomic and ﬁnancial stability. Consequently, the
multilateral institutions that promote capital market integration, like the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), have taken a different, more nuanced, approach to intertempo-
ral trade, as exempliﬁed in the recent IMF recommendations on the appropriate use of
capital controls; see Ostry, Ghosh, Habermeier, Chamon, Qureshi, and Reinhardt (2010).
Although the terms-of-trade effects emphasized in the international trade literature have
natural implications for the analysis of optimal capital controls, these effects play little
role in the existing international macro literature.
The objective of this paper is to bridge the gap between the trade approach to tariffs
and the macroeconomic approach to capital controls. The basic idea is to use standard op-
timal tariff arguments to study taxes on international capital ﬂows. Our objective is not to
argue that the only motive for observed capital controls is the distortion of relative prices
or that the removal of such distortions should be the only goal of international policy co-
ordination. Rather, we want to develop some basic tools to think about capital controls
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Figure 1: International Trade and Financial Integration
Note: The blue line represents the sum of world export and imports over world GDP (source:
IMF World Economic Outlook). The purple line represents the sum of world assets and world
liabilities over world GDP (source: updated and extended version of dataset constructed by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2007))
tools in a simple economic environment where other effects of capital controls are muted:
namely, there are no effects on output levels, nominal prices and nominal exchange rates,
and no effects on ﬁnancial stability. Our hope is that the tools developed here can be in-
corporated in richer models where these other channels are active and that our analysis
will help shed light on their interactions.
The starting point of our paper is that in an Arrow-Debreu economy there is no differ-
ence between intertemporal trade and intratemporal trade. In such an environment, one
only needs to relabel goods by time period and the same approach used to study static
terms-of-trade manipulation can be used to analyze dynamic terms-of-trade manipula-
tion. Our results will build on this simple observation together with the time-separable
structure of preferences typically used in macro applications. The only precedent that we
know of our approach to intertemporal trade policy is the textbook treatment of a two-
period, two-country, one-good endowment economy in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). By
considering a richer economic environment, our analysis will not only provide more gen-
eral results, but also allow us to uncover one key principle: unilaterally optimal capital
controls are not guided by the absolute desire to alter the intertemporal price of goods
produced in a given period, but rather by the relative strength of this desire between
two consecutive periods. If a country is a net seller of goods dated t and t + 1 in equal
amounts, and faces equal elasticities in both periods, there is no incentive for the country
to distort the saving decisions of its consumers at date t. It is the time variation in the
incentive to distort intertemporal prices that leads to non-zero capital controls.
Speciﬁcally, we consider an inﬁnite horizon, two-country, one-good endowment econ-
omy. In this model the only relative prices are real interest rates. We solve for the uni-
3laterally optimal taxes on international capital ﬂows in one country, Home, under the
assumption that the other country, Foreign, is passive.1 In this environment, the principle
described above has sharp implications for the direction of optimal capital ﬂow taxes. In
particular, it is optimal for Home to tax capital inﬂows (or subsidize capital outﬂows) in
periods in which Home is growing faster than the rest of the world and to tax capital
outﬂows (or subsidize capital inﬂows) in periods in which it is growing more slowly. Ac-
cordingly, if relative endowments converge to a steady state, then taxes on international
capital ﬂows converge to zero. Although our theory of capital controls emphasizes inter-
est rate manipulation, the net ﬁnancial position of Home per se, which might appear to
be central in a two-period model, is shown to be irrelevant.
The intuition for our results is as follows. Consider Home’s incentives to distort do-
mestic consumption in each period. In periods of larger trade deﬁcits, it has a stronger
incentive, as a buyer, to distort prices downward by lowering domestic consumption.
Similarly, in periods of larger trade surpluses, it has a stronger incentive, as a seller, to
distort prices upward by raising domestic consumption. Since periods of faster growth
at home tend to be associated with either lower future trade deﬁcits or larger future trade
surpluses, Home always has an incentive to raise future consumption relative to current
consumption in such periods. This is exactly what taxes on capital inﬂows or subsidies on
capital outﬂows accomplish through their effects on relative distortions across periods.
The next step in our paper is to extend the analysis to the case of multiple goods,
thereby allowing for both intertemporal and intratemporal trade. In order to maintain
the focus of our analysis on capital controls, we assume that Home can still choose its
taxes on capital ﬂows unilaterally, but that it is constrained by a free-trade agreement that
prohibits good-speciﬁc taxes/subsidies in all periods. In this environment, we show that
the incentive to distort trade over time does not depend only on the overall growth of
the country’s output relative to the world, but also on its composition. We do so in two
ways. First, we establish a general formula that relates intertemporal distortions to the
covariance between the price elasticities of different goods and the change in the value of
home endowments. Ceteris paribus, we show that Home is more likely to raise aggregate
consumption if a change in the value of home endowments is tilted towards goods whose
prices are more manipulable. Second, we illustrate through a simple analytical example
how such compositional issues relate to cross-country differences in demand. In a multi
good world in which countries have different preferences, a change in the time proﬁle of
1Throughout our analysis, we assume that the home government can freely commit at date 0 to a se-
quence of taxes. In the economic environment considered in this paper, this is a fairly mild assumption. As
we formally establish in Section 3.4, if the home government can enter debt commitments at all maturities,
as in Lucas and Stokey (1983), the optimal sequence of taxes under commitment is time-consistent.
4consumption not only affects the interest rate but also the relative prices of consumption
goods in each given period. This is an effect familiar from the literature on the transfer
problem, which goes back to the debate between Keynes (1929) and Ohlin (1929). In
our context this means that by distorting its consumers’ decision to allocate spending
between different periods a country also affects its static terms of trade. Even if all static
trade distortions are banned by a free-trade agreement, our analysis demonstrates that
intratemporal prices may not be at their undistorted levels if capital controls are allowed.
We conclude by considering the case of capital control wars in which the two coun-
tries simultaneously set taxes on capital ﬂows optimally at date 0, taking as given the
sequence of taxes chosen by the other country. In this situation, we show that results
derived in the one-good case are affected in two ways. First, unlike in the case in which
capital controls are set unilaterally, domestic consumption may decrease with domestic
endowments, even though both countries would have liked domestic consumption to in-
crease in the absence of policy response from the other country. Second, even if domestic
consumption is increasing in domestic endowments, as in our earlier analysis, one can
only relate periods of growth in one country to its taxes on capital ﬂows relative to the
other country, not their absolute level. In the simple quantitative example that we con-
sider, we ﬁnd that the net distortion on capital ﬂows in the Nash equilibrium is larger
than in the unilateral case: far from canceling each other out, capital ﬂow taxes imposed
by both countries make both countries worse off.
Our paper attacks an international macroeconomic question following a classical ap-
proach from the international trade literature and using tools from the dynamic public
ﬁnance literature. In international macro, the closest literature is a growing theoretical
literature demonstrating, among other things, how restrictions on international capital
ﬂows may be welfare-enhancing in the presence of various credit market imperfections;
see e.g. Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Caballero and Lorenzoni (2007), Aoki, Benigno, and
Kiyotaki (2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), and Martin and Taddei (2010). In addition
to these second-best arguments, there also exists an older literature emphasizing the so-
called “trilemma”: one cannot have a ﬁxed exchange rate, an independent monetary pol-
icy and free capital mobility; see e.g. McKinnon and Oates (1966), or more recently, Ob-
stfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2010). To the extent that having ﬁxed exchange and an
independent monetary policy may be welfare-enhancing, such papers offer a distinct ra-
tionale for capital controls.
On the international trade side, the literature on optimal taxes in open economies
is large and varied; see Dixit (1985) for an overview. The common starting point of
most trade policy papers, however, is that international trade is balanced. They there-
5fore abstract from intertemporal considerations.2 While one could, in principle, go from
intratemporal to intertemporal trade policy by relabeling goods in an abstract Arrow-
Debreu economy, existing trade policy papers typically focus on low-dimensional gen-
eral equilibrium models, i.e., with only two goods. Exceptions featuring more than two
goods only offer: (i) partial equilibrium results under the assumption of quasi-linear pref-
erences; (ii) sufﬁcient conditions under which seemingly paradoxical results may arise,
see e.g. Feenstra (1986) and Itoh and Kiyono (1987); or (iii) fairly weak restriction on the
structure of optimal trade policy, see e.g. Bond (1990). Thus there are no ‘off-the-shelf’
results from the existing trade literature that directly apply to the dynamic environment
considered in our paper.
In terms of methodology, we follow the dynamic public ﬁnance literature and use the
primal approach to characterize ﬁrst optimal wedges rather than explicit policy instru-
ments; see e.g. Lucas and Stokey (1983). Since there are typically many ways to imple-
ment the optimal allocation in an intertemporal context, this approach will help us clarify
the equivalence between capital controls and other policy instruments. Finally, since our
theory of capital controls models one of the two governments as a dynamic monopolist
optimally choosing the pattern of consumption over time, our analysis bears some resem-
blance to the problem of a dynamic monopolist optimally choosing the rate of extraction
of some exhaustible resources; see Stiglitz (1976).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes a simple one-good
economy. Section 3 characterizes the structure of optimal capital controls in this environ-
ment. Section 4 extends our results to the case of many goods. Section 5 considers the
case of capital control wars. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Basic Environment
2.1 A Dynamic Endowment Economy
There are two countries, Home and Foreign. Time is discrete and inﬁnite, t = 0,1,...
and there is no uncertainty. The preferences of the representative consumer at home are





2A notable exception is Bagwell and Staiger (1990), though their focus is on self-enforcing trade agree-
ments. See Staiger (1995) for an overview of that literature.
6where ct denotes consumption, u is an increasing, concave function, and b 2 (0,1) is the
discount factor. The preferences of the representative consumer abroad have a similar
form, with asterisks denoting foreign variables.
Both domestic and foreign consumers receive an endowment sequence denoted by
fytg and fy
tg, respectively. We make two simplifying assumptions: world endowments
are ﬁxed across periods, yt + y
t = Y, and the home and foreign consumer have the same
discount factor, b = b. Accordingly, in the absence of distortions, there should be perfect
consumption smoothing across time in both countries.
We assume that both countries begin with zero assets at date 0. Let pt be the price of a
unit of consumption in period t on the world capital markets. In the absence of taxes, the




pt(ct   yt)  0.
The budget constraint of of the foreign consumer is the same expression with asterisks on
ct and yt.
2.2 A Dynamic Monopolist
For most of the paper, we will focus on the case in which the home government sets taxes
oncapitalﬂowsinordertomaximizedomesticwelfare, assumingtheforeigngovernment
is passive: it does not have any tax policy in place and does not respond to variations in
the home policy. We will look at the case where both governments set taxes strategically
in Section 5.
In order to characterize the optimal policy of the home government, we follow the
dynamic public ﬁnance literature and use the primal approach. That is, we approach
the optimal policy problem of the home government by studying a planning problem in
which equilibrium quantities are chosen directly and address implementation issues later.
Formally, we assume that the objective of the home government is to maximize the
lifetime utility of the representative domestic consumer subject to (i) utility maximization
by the foreign consumer at (undistorted) world prices pt, and (ii) market clearing in each
period. The foreign consumer ﬁrst-order conditions are given by
btu0(c






t) = 0, (2)
7where l is the Lagrange multiplier on the foreign consumer’s budget constraint. More-
over, goods market clearing requires
ct + c
t = Y. (3)












btu0(Y   ct)(ct   yt) = 0. (4)
Equation (4) is an implementability constraint, familiar from the optimal taxation litera-
ture. Note that given a sequence of domestic consumption, condition (4) is also sufﬁcient
to ensure the existence of a feasible, utility-maximizing consumption sequence for For-
eign. The argument is constructive: given fctg, the proposed sequence fc
tg is obtained
from market clearing (3) and the sequence of prices is computed from (1), so that (2) is
implied by (4), ensuring that the foreign consumer’s sufﬁcient conditions for optimality
are met.
3 Optimal Capital Controls
3.1 Optimal Allocation
We ﬁrst describe how home consumption fctg ﬂuctuates with home endowments fytg
along the optimal path. Next we will show how the optimal allocation can be imple-
mented using taxes on international capital ﬂows.
The ﬁrst-order condition associated with Home’s planning problem is given by
u0(ct) = m

u0(Y   ct)   u00(Y   ct)(ct   yt)

, (5)
where m is the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint. This condition
immediately leads to our ﬁrst observation. Although the entire sequence fytg affects
the level of current consumption through their effects on the Lagrange multiplier m, we
see that variations in current consumption ct along the optimal path only depend on
variations in the current value of yt.
The next proposition shows that, whatever the shape of the utility functions u and u,
80
u0(c)
µ[u∗0(Y −c)−u∗00(Y −c)(c −yt)]
µu∗0(Y −c)
µ[u∗0(Y −c)−u∗00(Y −c)(c −ys)]
c Y ct cs yt ys
Figure 2: Consumption is Procyclical Along the Optimal Path
there is a monotonic relationship between domestic consumption and domestic endow-
ments along the optimal path.
Proposition 1 (Procyclical consumption) For any two periods t and s, if the home endowment is
larger in s, ys > yt, then the home consumption is also higher, cs > ct.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of Home’s planning problem. On the x-
axis we have domestic consumption c, which determines foreign consumption, Y   c, by
market clearing. The decreasing blue curve labeled u0(c) represents the marginal utility of
the home consumer. The increasing red curve represents the marginal revenue associated
with reducing consumption at home by a small amount and thus (i) increasing net sales,
and (ii) decreasing the intertemporal price of the t-dated good. The optimal consumption
choice at t corresponds to the point where the two curves meet, that is, where marginal
revenue is equalized with the marginal cost of reducing home consumption, which is just
u0(c). The same reasoning applies in period s, but with the marginal revenue represented
by the light blue dashed curve.
9Figure 2 gives an intuition for Proposition 1. As the endowment increases from yt to
ys, the curve u0(c) does not move. At the same time, the marginal revenue curve shifts
down, as the price decrease associated to a reduction in c applies to a larger amount
of inframarginal units sold. This induces Home to consume more, explaining why con-
sumption is procyclical along the optimal path.
As a preliminary step in the analysis of optimal capital ﬂow taxes, we conclude this
section by describing how the “wedge” between the marginal utility of domestic and






By market clearing, we know that c
t = Y   ct. Thus combining the deﬁnition of tt with
the strict concavity of u and u, we obtain the following corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 (Countercyclical wedges) For any two periods t and s, if the home endowment is
larger in s, ys > yt, then the wedge is lower, ts < tt.
The existing trade policy literature provides a useful way to interpret Corollary 1. By




(ct   yt). (7)
Condition (7) is closely related to the well-known optimal tariff formula involving the
elasticity of the foreign export supply curve in static trade models with two goods and/or
quasi-linear preferences. This should not be too surprising since tt measures the differ-
ence between the marginal utility of domestic and foreign consumption. According to
equation (7), the wedge tt is positive in periods of trade deﬁcit and negative in periods
of trade surplus. This captures the idea that if (time-varying) trade taxes were available,
Home would like to tax imports if ct   yt > 0 and tax exports if ct   yt < 0. Corollary 1,
however, goes beyond this simple observation by establishing a monotonic relationship
between tt and yt. This insight will play a key role in our analysis of optimal capital
controls, to which we now turn.3
3A natural question is whether the same logic implies a monotonic relationship between tt and net
imports, ct   yt. Perhaps surprisingly, this is not necessarily the case. While the sign of the slopes of u0(c)
and mu0(Y   c) is unambiguous (by concavity) the sign of the slope of the marginal return curve could
in general be positive or negative. This opens up the possibility that a positive output shock may lead
to an increase in import volumes, and so by Proposition 1, that an increase in import volumes may be
accompanied by a decrease in tt along the optimal path.
103.2 Optimal Taxes on International Capital Flows
It is well-known from the Ramsey taxation literature that there are typically many com-
binations of taxes that can implement the optimal allocation; see e.g. Chari and Kehoe
(1999). Here, we focus on the tax instrument most directly related to world interest rate
manipulation: taxes on international capital ﬂows.4
Forexpositionalpurposes, weassumethatconsumerscanonlytradeone-periodbonds
on international capital markets, with the home government imposing a proportional tax
qt on the gross return on net asset position in international bond markets. Standard ar-
guments show that any competitive equilibrium supported by intertemporal trading of
consumption claims at date 0 can be supported by trading of one-period bonds. As we
discuss later in Section 3.4, none of the results presented here depend on the assumption
that one-period bonds are the only assets available.
With only one-period bonds, the per-period budget constraint of the home consumer
takes the form
qtat+1 + ct = yt + (1  qt) at   lt, (8)
where at denotes the current bond holdings, lt is a lump sum tax, and qt  pt+1/pt is
the price of one-period bonds at date t. In addition, consumers are subject to a standard
no-Ponzi condition, limt!¥ ptat  0. In this environment the home consumer’s Euler
equation takes the form
u0(ct) = b(1  qt)(1+ rt)u0(ct+1). (9)
where rt  1/qt   1 is the world interest rate. Given a solution fctg to Home’s planning





by equations (1) and (3). Thus, given fctg, we can use (9) to construct a unique sequence







4Other tax instruments that could be used to implement the optimal allocation include time-varying
trade and consumption taxes (possibly accompanied by production taxes in more general environments).
See Jeanne (2011) for a detailed discussion of the equivalence between capital controls and trade taxes.
11which ensures that the per-period budget constraint (8) and the no-Ponzi condition are
satisﬁed. Since (8), (9), and the no-Ponzi condition are sufﬁcient for optimality it follows
that given prices and taxes, fctg is optimal for the home consumer. This establishes that
any solution fctg of (P) can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium with taxes.
A positive qt can be interpreted as imposing simultaneously a tax qt on capital out-
ﬂows and a subsidy qt to capital inﬂows. Obviously, since there is a representative con-
sumer, only one of the two is active in equilibrium: the outﬂow tax if the country is a net
lender, at > 0, and the inﬂow subsidy if it is a net borrower, at < 0. Similarly, a negative
qt can be interpreted as a subsidy on capital outﬂows plus a tax on capital inﬂows. The
bottom line is that qt > 0 discourages domestic savings while qt < 0 encourages them.
In Foreign, since there are no capital ﬂow taxes, the Euler equation takes the form
u0(c
t) = b(1+ rt)u0(c
t+1). (10)
Combining the deﬁnition of the wedge (6) with the Euler equations at home and abroad






The previous subsection has already established that variations in domestic consumption
ct along the optimal path are only a function of the current endowment yt. Since tt is
only a function of ct, equation (11) implies that variations in qt are only a function of yt
and yt+1. Combining equation (11) with Corollary 1, we then obtain the following result
about the structure of optimal capital controls.
Proposition 2 (Optimal capital ﬂow taxes) Suppose that the optimal policy is implemented with
capital ﬂows taxes. Then it is optimal:
1. to tax capital inﬂows/subsidize capital outﬂows (qt < 0) if yt+1 > yt;
2. to tax capital outﬂows/subsidize capital inﬂows (qt > 0) if yt+1 < yt;
3. not to distort capital ﬂows (qt = 0) if yt+1 = yt.
Proposition 2 builds on the same logic as Proposition 1. Suppose, for instance, that
Home is running a trade deﬁcit in periods t and t + 1. In this case, the home govern-
ment wants to exercise its monopsony power by lowering domestic consumption in both
periods. But if Home grows between these two periods, yt+1 > yt, the number of units
12imported from abroad is lower in period t + 1. Thus the home government has less in-
centive to lower consumption in that period. This explains why a tax on capital inﬂows is
optimal in period t: it reduces borrowing in period t, thereby shifting consumption from
period t to period t + 1. The other results follow a similar logic.
It is worth emphasizing that, although the only motive for capital controls in our
model is interest rate manipulation, the net ﬁnancial position of Home in any particu-
lar period, debtor or creditor, is not the relevant variable to look at to sign the optimal
direction of the tax. This is because the effect of a capital ﬂow tax is to affect the relative
distortion in consumption decisions between two consecutive periods. Therefore, what
matters is whether the monopolistic/monopsonistic incentives to restrict domestic con-
sumption are stronger in period t or t + 1. In our simple endowment economy, these
incentives are purely captured by the growth rate of the endowment, but the same broad
principle would extend to more general environments.
Proposition 2 has a number of interesting implications. Consider ﬁrst an economy that
is catching up with the rest of the world in the sense that yt+1 > yt for all t. According to
our analysis, it is optimal for this country to tax capital inﬂows and to subsidize capital
outﬂows. The basic intuition is that a growing country will export more tomorrow than
today. Thus it has more incentive to increase export prices in the future, which it can
achieve by raising future consumption through a subsidy on capital outﬂows. For an
economy catching up with the rest of the world, larger beneﬁts from future terms-of-trade
manipulation are associated with taxes and subsidies that encourage domestic savings.
Consider instead a country that at time t borrows from abroad in anticipation of a
temporary boom. In particular, suppose that yt+1 > yt and ys = yt for all s > t + 1. In
this situation, the logic of Proposition 2 implies that, at time t, at the onset of the boom, it
is optimal to impose restrictions on short-term capital inﬂows, i.e., to tax bonds with one-
period maturity and leave long-term capital inﬂows unrestricted.5 This example provides
a different perspective on why governments may try to alter the composition of capital
ﬂows in favor of longer maturity ﬂows in practice; see Magud, Reinhart, and Rogoff
(2011). In our model, incentives to alter the composition of capital ﬂows do not come
from the fear of “hot money” but from larger beneﬁts of terms-of-trade manipulation in
the short run.
Finally, Proposition 2 has sharp implications for the structure of optimal capital con-
trols in the long-run.
5The tax on two period bonds is easily shown to be (1  qt)(1  qt+1)  1 and Proposition 1 implies that
it is zero in our example.
13Corollary 2 (No tax in steady state) In the long run, if endowments converge to a steady state,
yt ! y, then taxes on international capital ﬂows converge to zero, qt ! 0.
Corollary 2 is reminiscent of the Chamley-Judd result (Judd, 1985; Chamley, 1986) of
zero capital income tax in the long-run. Intuitively, the home government would like
to use its monopoly power to inﬂuence intertemporal prices to favor the present value
of its income. However, at a steady state all periods are symmetric, so it is not optimal
to manipulate relative prices. Note that a steady state may be reached with trade bal-
ance, trade deﬁcit or trade surplus. Which of these cases applies depends on the entire
sequence fytg. Our analysis demonstrates that taxes on international capital ﬂows are
unaffected by these long-run relative wealth dynamics. For instance, even if Home, say,
becomes heavily indebted, it is not optimal to lower long run interest rates. In our model,
even away from a steady state, taxes on international capital ﬂows are determined by the
endowments at t and t + 1 only.
3.3 An Example with CRRA Utility and Aggregate Fluctuations
Up to now we have focused on the case of a ﬁxed world endowment. Thus we have
looked at how optimal capital controls respond to a reallocation of resources between
countries, keeping the total pie ﬁxed. This provides a useful benchmark in which all ﬂuc-
tuations in consumption reﬂect the incentives of the home government to manipulate the
world interest rate. Here we show that if domestic and foreign consumers have identi-
cal CRRA utility functions, then our results extend to economies with aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions. We also take advantage of this example for a simple exploration of the magnitudes
involved with optimal capital controls in terms of quantities and welfare.
Our characterization of the optimal policy of the home government extends immedi-
ately to the case of a time-varying world endowment: one just needs to replace Y with
Yt in equation (5). Under the assumption of identical CRRA utility functions, u(c) =
u(c) = c1 g/(1  g) with g  0, this leads to a simple relationship between the home













The left-hand side is decreasing in ct/Yt, whereas the right-hand side is increasing in
ct/Yt and decreasing in yt/Yt. Thus the implicit function theorem implies that, along
the optimal path, the home share of world consumption, c/Y, is strictly increasing in





























Figure 3: Optimal Allocation and Taxes for the Country Catching Up
Note: In the left panel, the red line is the exogenous path for the endowment, the blue line is
consumption at the optimal policy of the home government, and the dashed line is the efﬁcient
no-tax benchmark. In the right panel, the blue line is the capital ﬂow tax and the green line the
home assets-to-world-GDP ratio.
the home share of world endowments, y/Y. Put simply, if utility functions are CRRA,
Proposition 1 generalizes to environments with aggregate ﬂuctuations.
Now consider the wedge tt between the marginal utility of domestic and foreign con-









According to this expression, if c/Y is strictly increasing in y/Y along the optimal path,
then t is strictlydecreasing. The same logicas in Section 3.2 therefore implies that optimal
taxes on capital ﬂows must be such that qt < 0 if and only if yt+1/Yt+1 > yt/Yt. In other
words, if utility functions are CRRA, Proposition 2 also generalizes to environments with
aggregate ﬂuctuations.
As a quantitative illustration of our theory of capital controls as dynamic terms-of-
trade manipulation, suppose that foreign endowments fy
tg are growing at the constant
rate g = 3% per year and that Home is catching up with the rest of the world. To be more
speciﬁc, suppose that the home endowment is 20% of world endowments at date 0 and
that it is converging towards being 50% in the long run, with the ratio yt/y
t converging
to its long run value at a constant speed h = 0.05.6
6That is, we assume that
yt/y
t   a = (y0/y
0   a)e ht,
with a = 0.5/0.5 = 1 > y0/y
0 = 0.2/0.8 = 0.25.


























Figure 4: Optimal Allocation and Taxes for the Rest of the World
Note: In the left panel, the red line is the exogenous path for the endowment, the blue line is
consumption at the foreign optimal policy, and the dashed line is the efﬁcient no-tax benchmark.
In the right panel, the blue line is the capital ﬂow tax and the green line the foreign assets-to-
world-GDP ratio.
Figure 3 shows the path of the home share of world endowments and consumption,
assuming a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution, g = 1. For comparison, we also
plot the path for consumption in the benchmark case with no capital controls. In this
case, consistently with consumption smoothing, Home consumes a ﬁxed fraction of the
world endowment in all periods. Although optimal capital controls reduce consumption
smoothing, intertemporal trade ﬂows are several times larger than domestic output. The
optimal tax on capital inﬂows is less than 1% at date 0 and vanishing in the long run, fol-
lowing the same logic as for Corollary 2. Perhaps surprisingly, the optimal tax on capital
inﬂows decreases as the value of the home debt increases. Compared to the benchmark
with no capital controls, optimal taxes are associated with an increase in domestic con-
sumption of 0.12% and a decrease in foreign consumption of 0.07%. Though the welfare
impact of optimal capital controls is admittedly not large in this particular example, it is
not much smaller than either the estimated gains of international trade or ﬁnancial inte-
gration.7
Figure 4 considers the same exogenous path for endowments, but assumes that it is
the foreign country, instead of the home country, that is imposing capital ﬂow taxes op-
timally. Formally, the home share of world endowments is now 80% at date 0 and is
7According to a fairly large class of trade models, the welfare gains from international trade in the
United States are between 0.7% and 1.4% of real GDP; see Arkolakis, Costinot, and Rodríguez-Clare (2009).
Similarly, the welfare gains from switching from ﬁnancial autarky to perfect capital mobility is roughly
equivalent to a 1% permanent increase in consumption for the typical non-OECD country; see Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2006).
16converging towards being 50% in the long-run. In this situation, we see that optimal
taxes on international capital ﬂows are about three times as large as in the previous case,
reﬂecting the greater size of the rest of the world, and hence its greater ability to manipu-
late world interest rates. The impact on welfare is larger as well. In this second example,
domestic consumption increases by 0.27% compared to the benchmark with no capital
controls, whereas foreign consumption decreases by 1.27%. With higher values of g, i.e.
lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution, we obtain similar though slightly higher
numbers. For instance, for g = 2, the increase in domestic consumption is equal to 0.48%
and the decrease in foreign consumption to 2.5%.8
3.4 Initial Assets, Debt Maturity, and Time-Consistency
So far, we have focused on environments in which: (i) there are no initial assets at date
0 and (ii) one-period bonds are the only assets available. We now brieﬂy discuss how
relaxing both assumptions affects our results. We also show that if more debt instruments
are available, the optimal allocation is time-consistent: a future government free to choose
future consumption, but forced to fulﬁll previous debt obligations would not want to
deviate from the consumption path chosen by its predecessors.
Let at,s represents holdings at time t of bonds maturing at time s. Suppose the home
consumer enters date 0 with initial asset holdings fa0,tg¥
t=0. The asset holdings now enter
the intertemporal budget constraints of the home and foreign consumers. In particular,









0,t =  a0,t denotes initial asset holdings abroad. The other equilibrium conditions











btu0(Y   ct)(ct   yt + a
0,t) = 0. (12)
8In general, changing g has non-monotonic effects on the welfare impact of optimal capital controls.
Intuitively, since Home and Foreign have the same intertemporal elasticity of substitution, changing g
affects both the marginal revenue and the marginal cost of a dynamic monopolist, as described in Figure 2.
17Compared to the case without initial assets, the only difference is the new implementabil-
ity constraint (12) that depends on fyt   a
0,tg rather than fytg. Accordingly, Proposition
1 and Corollary 1 simply generalize to environments with initial assets fa
0,tg¥
t=0 provided
that they are restated in terms of changes in yt   a
0,t rather than changes in yt.
Throughoutouranalysis, wehaveassumedthatthehomegovernmentcanfreelycom-
mit at date 0 to a consumption path fctg. Now that we have recognized the role of the
initial asset positions, this assumption may seem uncomfortably restrictive. After all,
along the optimal path, the debt obligations fa
t,sg¥
s=t held at date t will typically be dif-
ferent from the obligations fa
0,sg¥
s=t held at date 0. Accordingly, a government at later
dates may beneﬁt from deviating from the consumption chosen at date 0.
We now demonstrate that this is not the case if the government has access to bonds
of arbitrary maturity. The basic idea builds on the original insight of Lucas and Stokey
(1983). At any date t, the foreign consumer is indifferent between many future asset
holdings fa
t+1,sg¥
s=t+1. Given a consumption sequence fc
tg that maximizes her utility







t+1,s) = 0. (13)
As we show in the appendix, this degree of freedom is sufﬁcient for the home government
at date 0 to construct sequences of debt obligations fa
t,sg¥












bsu0(Y   cs)(cs   ys + a
t,s) = 0 (14)
coincides with the solution of (P0) at all dates t  0. In short, if the home government can
enter debt commitments at all maturities, the optimal allocation derived in Section 3.1 is
time-consistent.
4 Intertemporal and Intratemporal Trade
How do the incentives to tax capital ﬂows change in a world with many goods? In a one-
good economy, the only form of terms-of-trade manipulation achieved by taxing capital
ﬂows is to manipulate the world interest rate. In a world with many goods, distorting the
borrowing and lending decisions of domestic consumers also affects the relative prices
18of the different goods traded in each period. In this section, we explore how these new
intratemporal considerations change optimal capital ﬂow distortions.
In order to maintain the focus of our analysis on optimal capital controls, we proceed
under the assumption that Home is constrained by an international free-trade agreement
that prohibits good speciﬁc taxes/subsidies in all periods. As in the previous section,
Homeisstillallowedtoimposetaxesoncapitalﬂowsthatdistortintertemporaldecisions.
ThismeansthatwhileHomecannotcontrolthepathofconsumptionofeachspeciﬁcgood
i, it can still control the path of aggregate consumption. As we shall see, in general, the
path of aggregate consumption can affect relative prices at any point in time, thus creating
additional room for terms-of-trade manipulation.
4.1 The Monopolist Problem Revisited
The basic environment is the same as in Section 2.1, except that there are n > 1 goods.
Thus domestic consumption and output, ct and yt, are now vectors in Rn
+. We assume





where U is increasing and strictly concave, Ct  g(ct) is aggregate domestic consump-
tion at date t, and g is increasing, concave, and homogeneous of degree one. Analogous
deﬁnitions apply to U and C
t  g (c
t).





pt  (ct   yt)  0,
where pt 2 Rn
+ denotes the intertemporal price vector for period-t goods and  is the inner
product. A similar budget constraint applies in Foreign.
As in Section 2.2, we use the primal approach to characterize the optimal policy of the
home government. In this new environment, the home government’s objective is to set
consumption fctg in order to maximize the lifetime utility of its representative consumer
subject to (i) utility maximization by the foreign representative consumer at (undistorted)
world prices pt; (ii) market clearing in each period; and (iii) a free trade agreement that
rules out good speciﬁc taxes or subsidies.
Constraint (i) can be dealt with as we did in the one-good case. In vector notation,











t) = 0. (16)
Next, note that if Home cannot impose good speciﬁc taxes or subsidies, the relative price
of any two goods i and j in period t, pit/pjt, must be equal in the two countries and equal






t) in any period t is Pareto efﬁcient and solves
C (Ct) = max
c,c fg(c) subject to c + c = Y and g(c)  Ctg (17)
for some Ct. Therefore, constraints (ii) and (iii), can be captured by letting Home choose
an aggregate consumption level Ct, which identiﬁes a point on the static Pareto frontier.
The consumption vectors at time t are then given by the corresponding solutions to prob-
lem (17), which we denote by c(Ct) and c (Ct).











btr(Ct)  (c(Ct)   yt) = 0, (18)
where r(Ct)  U0 (C(Ct)) g
c(c (Ct)) and equation (18) is the counterpart of the imple-
mentability constraint in Section 2.2.
4.2 Optimal Allocation
With many goods, the ﬁrst-order condition associated with Home’s planning problem
generalizes to








 (c(Ct)   yt)

, (19)
where m still denotes the Lagrange multiplier on the implementability constraint. Armed
with condition (19), we can now follow the same strategy as in the one-good case. First
we will characterize how fCtg covaries with fytg along the optimal path. Second we will
20derive the associated implications for the structure of optimal capital controls.
The next proposition describes the relationship between domestic consumption and
domestic endowments along the optimal path.
Proposition 3 (Procyclical aggregate consumption) Suppose that between periods t and t + 1
there is a small change in the home endowment dyt+1 = yt+1   yt. Then the home consumption
is higher in period t + 1, Ct+1 > Ct, if and only if ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct  dyt+1 > 0.
In the one good case, ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct simpliﬁes to  u00(Y   ct), which is positive by the
concavity of u. Therefore, whether domestic consumption grows or not only depends on
whether the level of domestic endowments is increasing or decreasing. In the multi-good
case, by contrast, this also depends on the composition of domestic endowments and on
how relative prices respond to changes in Ct.
In order to highlight the importance of these compositional effects, in an economy
with many goods, consider the effect of a small change in domestic endowment that
leaves its market value unchanged atperiod t prices. Thatis, suppose r(Ct)dyt+1 = 0. In
the one good case this can only happen if the endowment level does not change, thereby
leading to a zero capital ﬂow tax. In the multi-good case this is no longer true. According









Here, what matters is whether the composition of endowments tilts towards goods that
are more or less price sensitive to changes in Ct. We will come back to the role of this
compositional effects in more detail in Section 4.4.
4.3 Optimal Taxes on International Capital Flows
In line with Section 3.2, let us again assume that consumers can only trade one-period
bonds on international capital markets. But compared to Section 3.2, suppose now that
there is one bond for each good. Since the home government cannot impose good spe-
ciﬁc taxes/subsidies, it must impose the same proportional tax qt on the gross return on
net lending in all bond markets. So the per period budget constraint of the domestic
consumer takes the form
pt+1  at+1 + pt  ct = pt  yt + (1  qt)(pt  at)   lt,
21where at 2 Rn
+ now denotes the vector of current asset positions and lt is a lump sum tax.
As before, the domestic consumer is subject to the no-Ponzi condition, limt!¥ pt  at  0.
The ﬁrst-order conditions associated with utility maximization at home are given by
U0 (Ct) gi(ct) = b(1  qt)(1+ rit)U0(Ct+1)gi(ct+1), for all i = 1,...,n. (20)
where rit  pit/pit+1   1 is a good-speciﬁc interest rate. Let Pt  minc fpt  c : g(c)  1g
denote the home consumer price index at date t. Using this notation, the previous condi-
tions can be rearranged in a more compact form as
U0 (Ct) = b(1  qt)(1+ Rt)U0(Ct+1), (21)
where Rt  Pt/Pt+1   1 is the home real interest rate at date t.9 Since there are no taxes
abroad, the same logic implies
U0 (C






t+1   1 is the foreign real interest rate at date t. Equations (21) and (22)
are the counterparts of the Euler equations (9) and (10) in the one-good case. Combining












Ifwefollowthesameapproachasintheone-goodcaseandlet tt  U0 (Ct)/mU0 (C
t ) 1
denote the wedge between the marginal utility of domestic and foreign consumption, we












Withmanygoods, thesignof qt dependson(i) whetherthewedge tt betweenthemarginal
utility of domestic and foreign consumption is increasing or decreasing and (ii) whether
Home’s real exchange rate, Pt/P
t , appreciates or depreciates between t and t + 1. Like
in the one-good case, one can check that the wedge is a decreasing function of home ag-
gregate consumption Ct. In the next proposition we further demonstrate that an increase
in Ct is always associated with an appreciation of Home’s real exchange rate. Combining
9 In the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix, we formally establish that Pt = pit/gi (ct) for all i =
1,...,n. Equation (21) directly derives from this observation and equation (20).
22these two observations with Proposition 3, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 (Optimal capital ﬂow taxes revisited) Suppose that the optimal policy is imple-
mented with capital ﬂow taxes and that between periods t and t + 1 there is a small change in the
home endowment dyt+1 = yt+1   yt. Then it is optimal:
1. to tax capital inﬂows/subsidize capital outﬂows (qt < 0) if ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct  dyt+1 > 0;
2. to tax capital outﬂows/subsidize capital inﬂows (qt > 0) if ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct  dyt+1 < 0;
3. not to distort capital ﬂows (qt = 0) if ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct  dyt+1 = 0.
In order to understand better how intertemporal and intratemporal considerations
affectthestructureoftheoptimaltaxschedule, letusdecomposethepricevectorinperiod
t into an intertemporal price and an intratemporal vector of relative prices: pt = P
t pt,
where pit  pit/P
t denotes the price of good i in terms of foreign consumption at date t.
Using the previous decomposition, we see that the sign of the expression ¶r(Ct)/¶Ct 










The ﬁrst term captures the intertemporal price channel and is proportional to the change
in the value of output. It is possible to show that P0 (Ct) > 0. Thus an increase in
the value of home output—all else equal—pushes in the direction of a tax on capital in-
ﬂows/subsidy to capital outﬂows. This follows the same logic as in the one-good case.
The new element is the second term in (23), which captures intratemporal terms-of-
trade effects. The sign of this term depends on the elasticity of relative prices to changes
in domestic consumption. To sign this term we need to know more about preferences.
The simplest case is the case of symmetric preferences in which g and g are the same.
In that case, the Pareto set in the Edgeworth box is a straight line and relative prices are
independent of the point we choose (i.e., of Ct). Not surprisingly, in this case the analysis
boils down to the one-good case. Therefore, the interesting case is the case of asymmetric
preferences, which we now turn to.
10Just notice that
rt = lb tpt = lb tP
t pt,












234.4 An Example with CRRA and Asymmetric Cobb-Douglas Utility
In this subsection we focus on a simple example in which the effects of intratemporal
considerations can be captured analytically. There are two goods. The upper-level utility




C1 g, C = ca
1c1 a
2 , (24)
where g  0 and a > 1/2. Foreign utility functions take the same form, but the roles of










Since a > 1/2, Home has a higher relative demand for good 1 in all periods. Without
risk of confusion, we now refer to good 1 and good 2 as Home’s “import-oriented” and
“export-oriented” sectors, respectively. The next proposition highlights how this distinc-
tion plays a key role in linking intertemporal and intratemporal terms-of-trade motives.11
Proposition 5 (Import- versus export-oriented growth) Suppose that equations (24)-(25) hold
with g  0 and a > 1/2 and that between periods t and t + 1 there is a small change in the
home endowment dyt+1 = yt+1   yt. If growth is import-oriented, dy1t+1 > 0 and dy2t+1 = 0,
it is optimal to tax capital inﬂows/subsidize capital outﬂows (qt < 0). Conversely, if growth is
export-oriented, dy1t = 0 and dy2t+1 > 0, it is optimal to tax capital inﬂows/subsidize capital













The idea behind the ﬁrst part of Proposition 5 is closely related to Proposition 2. In
periods in which Home controls a larger fraction of the world endowment of good 1, the
incentive to subsidize consumption C increases. Here, however, the reason is twofold.
First, a larger endowment of good 1 means that Home is running a smaller (net) trade
deﬁcit, which reduces the incentive to depress the intertemporal price P. Second, it
means that within the period the country is selling more of good 1. Since home prefer-
ences are biased towards good 1, an increase in C drives up the intratemporal price of
good 1, which further increases the incentives to subsidize aggregate consumption.
11Another simple example that can be solved analytically is the case of tradable and non-tradable goods.
If there only is one tradable good, then Proposition 2 applies unchanged to changes in the endowment of
the tradable good. The only difference between this case and the one-good case studied in Section 3 is
that taxes on capital inﬂows/subsidies on capital outﬂows (qt < 0) now are always accompanied by a real
exchange rate appreciation, whereas taxes on capital outﬂows/subsidies on capital inﬂows (qt > 0) now
are always accompanied by a real exchange rate depreciation
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Figure 5: Optimal Taxes under Import- and Export-Oriented Scenarios
Note: In both panels, the green line is the optimal tax on capital ﬂows under the import-oriented
scenario (growth in sector 1) and the blue line is the optimal tax on capital ﬂows under the export-
oriented scenario (growth in sector 2).
By contrast, when endowment growth is export-oriented, intertemporal and intratem-
poral considerations are not aligned anymore. If the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution, 1/g, is low enough, the intertemporal motive for terms-of-trade manipulation
dominates and we get the same result as in the one good economy. If instead that elas-
ticity is high enough, the result goes in the opposite direction. Namely, it is possible that
when Home receives a larger endowment of good 2, it decides to subsidize aggregate
consumption less, even though the increase in y2 is reducing its (net) trade deﬁcit. Intu-
itively, Home now beneﬁts from reducing its own consumption since this increases the
intratemporal price of good 2 due again to the fact that, relative to foreign preferences,
home preferences are biased towards good 1. Proposition 5 formally demonstrates that
the intratemporal terms-of-trade motive is more likely to dominate the intertemporal one
if demand differences between countries are large and/or Foreign accounts for a large
share of world consumption.
In orderto illustratethe quantitative importanceof this effect, we returnto the exercise
presented in Section 3.3 in which Home is catching up with the rest of the world. For
simplicity, the world endowments of both goods are assumed to be constant over time.
In the ﬁrst panel of Figure 5, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is set to unity,
g = 1, and demand differences are set such that a = 3/4. The green curve represents
the optimal tax on capital ﬂows in the import-oriented scenario: the home endowment of
good 2 is ﬁxed, but the home endowment of good 1 is 20% of world endowments at date
0 and is converging towards being 50% in the long run, with the ratio y1t/y
1t converging
to its long run value at a constant speed h = 0.05. The blue curve instead represents
25the optimal tax on capital ﬂows in the export-oriented scenario: the home endowment of
good 1 is ﬁxed, but the home endowment of good 2 is growing. In order to make the two
scenarios comparable, the growth rate of good 2’s endowments is chosen such that the
home share of world income in all periods is the same as in the import-oriented scenario.
In all periods we see that the optimal tax on capital inﬂows is lower in the export-oriented
scenario. While taxes converge to zero under both scenarios, the tax on capital inﬂows at
date 0 is four times larger in the import-oriented scenario than in the export-oriented one:
1.6% versus 0.4%. In the second panel of Figure 5, we repeat the same experiments under
the assumption that g = 0.33. In this situation, the intratemporal terms-of-trade motives
now dominate the intertemporal ones under the export-oriented scenario. When there is
growth at home relative to the rest of the world, but growth is concentrated in sector 2,
Home ﬁnds it optimal to subsidize rather than tax capital inﬂows. At date 0, the optimal
subsidy on capital inﬂows is now around 0.4%.
5 Capital Control Wars
In this section we go back to the one-good case, but consider the case in which both coun-
tries set capital controls optimally, taking as given the capital controls chosen by the other
country. As before, we assume that consumers can only trade one-period bonds on inter-
national capital markets, but we now let both the home and foreign government impose
proportional taxes qt and q
t , respectively, on the gross return on net asset position in
international bond markets. At date 0, we assume that the two governments simultane-
ously choose the sequences fqtg and fq
t g, and commit to them. While this assumption is
admittedly strong in this context, it has one key beneﬁt: it will allow us to use the same
primal approach developed in previous sections to offer a ﬁrst look at the outcome of
capital control wars.
5.1 Nash Equilibrium
We look for a Nash equilibrium, so we look at each government’s optimization problem
taking the other government’s tax sequence as given. Focusing on the problem of the
home government, the optimal taxes can be characterized in terms of a planner problem
involving directly the quantities consumed, as in the unilateral case. Given the sequence
fq
t g the foreign consumer’s Euler equation can be written as
u0(c
t) = b(1  q
t )(1+ rt)u0(c
t+1).































(ct   yt) = 0,
where the new implementability constraint captures the fact that the home government



























From the domestic consumer’s Euler equation, we also know that
u0(ct) = b(1  qt)(1+ rt)u0(ct+1). (29)











t+1) (ct+1   yt+1)
.














27Substituting for the foreign tax on international capital ﬂows in equation (28) and using
the good market clearing condition (3), we obtain
u0(ct) + u00(ct)(ct   yt)
u0(Y   ct)   u00(Y   ct)(ct   yt)
=
u0(ct+1) + u00(ct+1)(ct+1   yt+1)
u0(Y   ct+1)   u00(Y   ct+1)(ct+1   yt+1)
,
which can be rearranged as
u0(ct) + u00(ct)(ct   yt)
u0(Y   ct)   u00(Y   ct)(ct   yt)
= a, for all t  0, (30)
where a  [u0(c0) + u00(c0)(c0   y0)]/[u0(Y   c0)   u00(Y   c0)(c0   y0)] > 0. This is
the counterpart of equation (5) in Section 2. In particular, using equations (27) and (29)
and their counterparts in Foreign, one can check that a = lm/lm, where l and l are
the Lagrange multipliers associated with the intertemporal budget constraints in both
countries.
5.2 Main Results Revisited
With the analysis of Section 3 in mind, one might expect that an increase in y would
necessarily lead to an increase in c. Indeed, we have established that if Home were to
impose taxes unilaterally, it would like to increase c in response to a positive shock in
y. The same logic implies that if Foreign were to impose taxes unilaterally, it would like
to decrease c, i.e., to increase c as well, in response to a positive shock in y. Thus both
unilateral responses point towards an increasing relationship between c and y. Yet, as
the next lemma demonstrates, the relationship between endowments and consumption
along the Nash equilibrium is more subtle.




¶[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]/¶ct
[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]
< 1. (31)
InadditiontotheeffectsthatwerepresentinSection 3, thechangeinforeigntaxesmay
now lead Home to operate in a region in which prices are more manipulable. Broadly
speaking, Lemma 1 states that if there is a large number of inframarginal units and if
changes in consumption have large effects on changes in the price of these inframarginal
units, then c may be decreasing in y along the Nash equilibrium. A sufﬁcient condition
to rule out this scenario is that net exports, y   c, is not too large in equilibrium. An-
28other sufﬁcient condition is that utility functions are quadratic.12 In this case, changes in
consumption have no effects on changes in prices.
Under the assumption that inequality (31) holds, we can use Lemma 1 together with
the domestic and foreign consumer’s Euler equations to characterize capital control wars
the same way we characterized optimal capital controls in Section 3. Our main result
about capital control wars can be stated as follows.
Proposition 6 (Capital control wars) Suppose that inequality (31) holds. Then along the Nash
equilibrium, the home and foreign capital ﬂow taxes are such that:
1. Home interest rates are higher than foreign interest rates (qt < q
t ) if yt+1 > yt;
2. Home interest rates are lower than foreign interest rates (qt > q
t ) if yt+1 < yt;
3. Home and foreign interest rates are equal (qt = q
t ) if yt+1 = yt.
If there are no intertemporal distortions abroad, q
t = 0, then like in Section 3, an
increase in domestic endowments, yt+1 > yt, leads to a tax on capital inﬂows or a sub-
sidy to capital outﬂows, qt < 0, which is associated with higher domestic interest rates,
(1  qt)(1+ rt) > 1+ rt. In general, however, we cannot sign qt and q
t . The intuition for
this result is a combination of the intuition for the unilateral policy of Home and Foreign.
Suppose, for instance, that Home is running a trade deﬁcit in period t. An increase in the
home endowment reduces the trade deﬁcit and reduces the incentives of the home gov-
ernment to repress domestic consumption. Foreign incentives are symmetric, meaning
that the foreign government has less incentives to stimulate foreign consumption. The
increase in domestic consumption and the reduction in foreign consumption between pe-
riods t and t+1 can be achieved in two ways: by a tax on capital inﬂows at home, qt < 0,
or by a tax on capital outﬂows abroad, q
t > 0. Because of the general equilibrium re-
sponse of world prices, we do not necessarily need both. All we need is that qt < q
t , i.e.
that domestic interest rates are higher than foreign interest rates.
To conclude, we compare the Nash equilibrium capital ﬂow taxes to the unilaterally
optimal taxes for both countries, i.e. the best response to a zero tax, using again the pa-
rameterized example presented in Section 3.2. In Figure 6, we see that a capital control
war leads to a larger interest rate differential between the two countries (as a percentage
of the world return to net lending) than either one of the two unilateral outcomes con-
sidered in Section 3.2. Far from canceling each other out, the net distortion on capital
ﬂows is therefore larger when both countries set capital controls optimally. Compared to
12This immediately implies ¶[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]/¶ct = 0.











world return to net lending), while the dotted and dashed lines show the interest rate differentials
under the unilaterally optimal capital ﬂow taxes considered in Figures 3 and 4, respectively.
the benchmark with no capital controls, a capital control war here decreases consumption
by 0.49% in the country catching-up and by 0.05% in the rest of the world. Interestingly,
even though the interest rate differential is close to its value when the rest of the world
sets capital controls unilaterally, both countries are worse off in the Nash equilibrium. In
this particular example, neither country wins the capital control war.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have developed a theory of capital controls as dynamic terms-of-trade
manipulation. We have studied an inﬁnite horizon endowment economy with two coun-
tries where one country chooses taxes on international capital ﬂows in order to maximize
the welfare of its representative agent, while the other country is passive. We have shown
that capital controls are not guided by the absolute desire to alter the intertemporal price
of the goods produced in any given period, but rather by the relative strength of this de-
sire between two consecutive periods. Speciﬁcally, it is optimal for the strategic country
to tax capital inﬂows (or subsidize capital outﬂows) if it grows faster than the rest of the
world and to tax capital outﬂows (or subsidize capital inﬂows) if it grows more slowly.
In the long-run, if relative endowments converge to a steady state, taxes on international
capital ﬂows converge to zero. Although our theory emphasizes interest rate manipula-
tion, the country’s net ﬁnancial position per se is irrelevant.
With many goods, we have shown that optimal capital controls depend both on the
30level and composition of growth across goods. If countries have different preferences, a
change in the time proﬁle of consumption not only affects the interest rate but also the
relative prices of consumption goods in each given period. Accordingly, even if all static
trade distortions are banned by a free-trade agreement, intratemporal prices may not be
at their undistorted levels if capital controls are allowed. Finally we have studied capital
control wars in which the two countries simultaneously set taxes on capital ﬂows. In the
simple quantitative example that we consider, far from canceling each other out, the net
distortion on capital ﬂows is larger than in the unilateral case.
In order to maintain the focus of our analysis on optimal capital controls, we have ab-
stracted from environments with intratemporal and intertemporal trade in which coun-
tries can set good-and-time speciﬁc trade taxes. An interesting question that arises once
these more general policy instruments are allowed is whether restricting static trade dis-
tortions may contribute to reduce the incentives to use capital controls. Broadly speaking,
could free-trade agreements act as a substitute for agreements on capital controls? We
hope that our analysis will provide a useful starting point for thinking about this issue
as well as other related questions at the frontier of international macro and international
trade policy.
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¶ct fu0(ct)   m[u0(Y   ct)   u00(Y   ct)(ct   yt)]g
> 0, (34)
34where the inequality directly derives from inequality (33) and the strict concavity of u.
Inequality (34) implies that for any pair of periods, t and s, such that ys > yt, we must
have cs > ct.





t=1 denote the optimal
consumption paths for all dates t  1 from the point of view of the home government at
date 0 and date 1, respectively. We want show that one can construct fa
1,sg¥
s=1 satisfying
equation (13) at t = 0 such that c0
t = ct for all t  1. As in Lucas and Stokey (1983),
we focus on the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with Home’s planning problem at dates
t = 0 and t = 1. In the present environment, they imply
u0(ct) = m0

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where m0 and m1 are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the implementability con-
straints of the home government at dates 0 and 1, respectively. For a given value of m1, let
us construct a
1,t (m1) such that
m0
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By construction, if the previous condition holds, then, for any m1, equation (36) holds as
well if c0
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By equation (35), we know that 1  
u00(Y cs)(cs ys+a
0,s)
u0(Y cs) > 0. Thus we have m1 > 0. One










Thus, equation (13) is satisﬁed at t = 0. Since equations (13) and (14) evaluated at t = 0
and t = 1, respectively, are identical, we have constructed fa
1,sg¥
s=1 satisfying equation
(13) at t = 0 such that c0
t = ct for all t  1. The argument for other dates is similar.
Proof of Proposition 3. The basic strategy is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1.
The ﬁrst- and second-order conditions associated with Home’s planning problem imply:
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By inequality (41), we therefore have dCt > 0 if and only if åi
¶ri(Ct)
¶Ct dyit > 0.

















Since U and U are concave and C is decreasing in Ct along the Pareto frontier, we al-
ready know from Proposition 3 that
tt+1 < tt if and only if åi
¶ri(Ct)
¶Ct
dyit > 0. (43)
Now notice that by the envelope theorem, C0 (Ct) is equal to the opposite of the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the constraint g(c)  Ct in (17). Thus the ﬁrst-order conditions
36associated with that program imply
g
i (ct) =  C0 (Ct) gi (ct). (44)
Let us now show that Pt = pit/gi (ct). Let us denote ct (1)  argminc fpt  c : g(c)  1g.
The associated ﬁrst-order conditions are given by (i) pi = lgi [ct (1)] and (ii) g[ct (1)] =
1. This implies
Pt = åi pitcit (1) = låi gi [ct (1)]cit (1) = lg[ct (1)] = l,
where the third equality uses the fact that g is homogeneous of degree one. Combining
this equality with condition (i), we obtain Pt = pit/gi [ct (1)]. Since gi is homogeneous
of degree zero, this further implies Pt = pit/gi (ct) for all i = 1,...,n. The same logic
applied to Foreign implies P
t = pit/g
i (ct). Combining the two previous observations





Since g and g are concave and homogeneous of degree one, standard arguments imply
that the solution C of (17) is (weakly) concave in Ct. By Proposition 3, we therefore have
Pt+1/P
t+1 > Pt/P




dyit > 0. (45)
Combining equation (42) with conditions (43) and (45), we ﬁnally get qt < 0 if and only if
åi
¶ri(Ct)
¶Ct dyit > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that dyit+1 > 0 and dyjt+1 = 0. By Proposition 4, we
knowthat qt < 0ifandonlyif ¶r(Ct)/¶Ctdyt+1 > 0, where r(Ct)  U0 (C(Ct)) g
c(c (Ct)).
























Consider the ﬁrst term on the left-hand side of inequality (46). In the proof of Proposition








37Since U (C) = 1
1 g (C)
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¶Ct . Using the resource constraint, we can express equation (52) as
c1 (Ct) =
bc2 (Ct)Y1
Y2   (1  b)c2 (Ct)
.
Together with equation (53), using again the resource constraint, this implies
c2 (Ct) = Ct









Y2   (1  b)c2 (Ct)
Ct [Y2   (1  a)(1  b)c2 (Ct)]
. (55)








(b   1)c2 (Ct)
Y2 + (1  a)(b   1)c2 (Ct)
.
Using the deﬁnition of b  [a/(1  a)]
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.
Equations (48) and (49) directly derive from the previous expression and equations (50)
and (51), respectively.
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Since utility functions are Cobb-Douglas, g(c) = ca
1c1 a
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Combining these two observations with inequality (56), we conclude that if dy1t+1 = 0













Proof of Lemma 1. Let us rearrange equation (30) as
F(ct,yt) 





u0(Y   ct)   u00(Y   ct)(ct   yt)

= 0. (57)
Note that ¶F(ct,yt)/¶yt > 0 by strict concavity of u and u. Thus
dct/dyt =   ¶F(ct,yt)/¶yt

¶F(ct,yt)/¶ct > 0
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u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)

2  (yt   ct)
¶[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]/¶ct
[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]

.
Since u and u are strictly concave, this implies that
¶F(ct,yt)/¶ct < 0 if and only if
(yt   ct)
2
¶[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]/¶ct
[u00(ct) + au00(Y   ct)]
< 1.
Lemma 1 directly derives from the previous equivalence.





















By Lemma 1, we know that if inequality (31) holds, then ct is increasing in yt. Since u and




< 1 if and only if yt > yt+1.
Proposition 6 directly derives from the previous equivalence.
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